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A bstrac t
Thi s pap er a na l yzes w ag es t ruc t ur e s in t h e pub li c and the priv at e
sector for Germa n y . The data con ta i ns a ric h set of v a ri able s on par -
en ts’ c ha racteristi cs that w e use as in st rumen ts. W e exten d t h e empi r i cal
l iterature in t hi s ￿el d b y en dog e niz in g ed ucation l ev el and hours w ork ed ,
and b y usi ng l ife cycl e w ag ed i ￿ er en t i als i n t h e structura l se lec t i on equ a -
tion. W e sho w that these exten t i ons s i gni ￿can tly impro v e the st and a rd
mo del . Moreo v er, t h ey l ead to consi derably di ￿ er en t param et er esti-
mat es . W e compu t e cond iti o na la n d uncond iti o na lw age predi ctions for
the v arious sp eci ￿cations u sing mo de l s im ul a ti o ns .W e ￿ nd that, o na v-
erage, p o ten tial w ages in t h e priv at e sec t or excee d t ho se i n the p ubl ic
sector. Those actual ly w orkin g in the p ubl ic sector, w o u ld do somewhat
b ett er i n the p r iv ate sector, whi le t ho se w orking i n the pri v ate sector
w o u ld ear nm uc h l ess i n the pu bl ic secto r.
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1 In t ro duc tio n
In all i nd ustri al ize dc ou n tri es a nd m an y dev eloping cou n trie s the sta te has an i m p o rtan t
role as em plo y er. I n 198 0, to tal publi cs e ctor e m plo y m en t accrue dt oa n a v erage o f 24 . 2
p erce n t o f n on{a gric ultural em plo ym en t for oecd - cou n trie s . Publi c sector em plo ym en t
m a yo c c ur at di￿eren tl e v e ls, lik e the ce n tral go v ernm e n t, state and l o cal a uthoriti es a nd
￿na nc ial and n on￿na nc ial publi ce n terprises. M an y servi ces supp l ie db y the publi c sec to r
are no to n l y essen ti al , but a l so m o n opol iz ed. As a cons e quence ,e m plo ym en t conditi on s of
publi ce m plo y ees are not regulated b ym ark et forces, but rather de term i ned b y p oli tic ians
or p o l iti call yi m p o rtan ti n terest g roups (inc luding that of pu bl ic em plo y ees them sel v e s).
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W ag e sa n d w orking c o ndi tions in the pub l ic sec to r di￿er g e nerally from thos e i n the priv ate
sector. D e vic es whi c h rel at e w a ges to pro ducti vit y a re often m i ss i ng .
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Moreo v er, i f publ ic
sector e m plo y m en t is substa n tial, w age and em pl o ym e n tc o ndi tions o f t h e publi c sec to r
m a ya l so a￿ect c o ndi tions in the p ri v ate sector.
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In re cen ty e a rs, pub l ic sector em plo ym en t
conditi o ns and the e￿c ie nc y of the publi c sec to r v e rsu s th e pri v a te sector has b e com ea n
i m p ortan t pol icy issue. As a consequenc e, ec o nom ists ha v e b ecom e incre as i n gly in terested
i n a naly zing c o ndi tions in p ubl ic an d priv ate s e ctors . One m ain researc hi n te rest i s the
w ag e struc tu re in b oth se ctors .
Rel ying o n the ass um ption that in equi li brium som eone with a giv en v ector o f h um an
c a p i t a l c h a r ac teri st i cs sho ul d rec eiv e the sa m ew ag e in b oth sectors, s om e stud i es com pare
esti m ated co e￿c ien ts o f w ag e regressions a nd pre di cte dw a ges f o r the t w o sec to rs.
4
But
as a con se quence of di￿erenc es in o cc up ati o ns a nd requi rem en ts, sec to r c ho i ce m a yn o t
b e rando m . Thi sl eads to a sel ecti o n proble mi n estim at i ng w age eq ua ti o ns. The m ore
rec en tl iterature usua l ly tak es a c co un t of this b ye st i m ating s wi tc hi ng regression m od e ls.
Suc h an a nalysi s has b een p erform ed for v ar i o us cou n trie s. V an der Gaa g a nd Vi jv e rb e rg
(19 88) analyz e pub l ic - pri v at e se ctor em pl o ym en tf o rI v ory Co ast. Their OLS estim at e s
are cons i derably di ￿e r en t from esti m at es acc ou n t ing for sele cti o n bias. Sim ilar m ode ls a r e,
for exam ple , esti m ated fo r the U S( B elm a n and H eyw o o d, 19 89), P e ru (Stel cner e t al. ,
19 89), Italy (B run e ll o and Ri zzi , 19 93 ), a nd the Nethe rlands (Theeu w es et a l ., 19 85, v an
Ophem , 1 99 3, an d H a rtog and Oos te rb e ek, 199 3). P edersen e ta l . (199 0) a naly ze publ ic
{ pri v a te sector ea rni ng s in De nm a rk using panel da t a. Z w e im￿ ul le r and Win ter-Ebm er
(19 94) a naly ze w age structures for A us tri a. G i nd l ing (19 91 ) a nd T erre ll (1 993 ) pro v ide
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W he ther or not the de cisio n o f t he po l icy m ak er r epre se n ts i n this con te xt t he i n te res t o f the m edian
v o t e ri sa no pe n i s sue in the li t eratur e (se e, f or instanc e, Do wns (195 7) and R e der ( 1 975)).
2
In m a n yi ndus tria li z ed coun tries , publi c se ctor w a ges are bargai n ed bet w ee n publi c se ctor unio ns
and the go v e rnm en t. See Holm lund (19 93) and D eF ra ja (1 993) f or the o r etical m o dels. The bargai ning
outcom eb e t w e en publ ic se ctor uni ons and e m pl o y e rs is often in￿uenc ed b y agree m en ts i n the priv ate
se ctor. F or instance , Jacobson and Ohlsson (199 4) anal yze the lo ng-run re l ationship b et w ee n g o v er nm en t
w ag e s and priv a t e se ct o rw ages i nS w ede n a nd ￿n d th a t t he priv ate sec tor i s the w ag el ea de r.
3
Jacobse n (19 92) pro vi de s som e evidenc e for thi sh y po t hesis.
4
See , fo ri nst a nc e, Sm ith (197 6), G unde rson (1979 ), Shapi r o and Stelcn er (198 9) and P en g (1992 ).2
ev idenc e fo r Co sta Rica a nd Hai ti, re s p ect iv ely .
These stud i es ad dre s s the foll o wing questions: F irstly , wha t de term i nes the sele cti on i n
the priv ate and the pu bl ic sector. Sec o ndly , what are the di￿ere nc es i n the pa y structure
be t w e en the t w os e ctors. A nd thirdl y , wha t a re the conditional a nd unconditi o nal w ag e s
di￿ere n tials b et w ee n the t w os e ctors. Co nc lusions v a ry cons i derably a c ro ss the cou n trie s
ana l yze d. One m a y concl ud e from this tha t w ag e structure s , inc en ti v e s and sel ecti on
m e c hanism sb e t w ee n pub l ic and priv ate se ctor di￿er a cross coun tri es, whic hi s reas onable
i nv iew of the di v e rg en t instituti o nal set tings for priv ate and public sector o cc upa ti on s i n
d i ￿ e r e n t c o un trie s.
Ho w e v e r, som eti m es conclusions di ￿e r also b et w een s tudi es for the sam e coun try .A
r e a s o n f o r this is tha t results are v e ry sensitiv et om o del a ssum pti o ns. W es h o wi nt h i s
pap er that s om e a ssum ptions f requen tly m ad e i n thi sl ite ra ture are que st i o nable and tha t
sm all c ha nges i n the sp ec i￿cation of th e m o del m a yl e a d to di￿eren t concl us i o ns. A t the
sa m et i m e ,w e pro vide a ￿ r s t a nalysi so f p a y structures i n the p ubl ic a nd the priv ate
sector for Germ an y . W e use data from the Ge rm an So cio Econo m ic P anel . The data
pro vi de ba c kgrou nd i nfo rm at i o n on p aren ts’ so ci al an d e c o nom i c sta tus. This eq uips us
with ar i c hs e t of instrum e n ts and enables us to all o w fo r endo gene it yo f s o m e of the us ual
regressors in w ag e a nd c hoic e equations.
Ac rucial question in t hi st y p eo fm o dels i s iden ti￿cation. Non-p aram etri ci den ti ￿ca-
ti o n o f structural sel ecti on and w ag e e q u ati o ns requi res excl usion re st r icti o n so nv ariable s
i n b oth equations. Ma n y studies use di ￿e ren te duca t ion m easures in the w ag e e quations
and i n the sel ecti o n equation, and/ or u se ag e i n one equation and p oten ti al e xp erie nce
i n the other. F or i n stance, B el m an and H eyw oo d ( 19 89 ) u se c on tin uous m ea sures of e d-
ucation in the w ag e r e g ression a nd degrees in the sel ecti on e q u ation. V an d e r G aag a nd
Vi jv erb erg (19 88) and Stel cner et a l . (198 9) go ex ac tly the o pp o si te w a y .I den ti ￿cation i s
i n these c a ses obta i ned b yi m p osing di ￿e ren t restri cti o ns o n the w a y the sam ei nfo rm at i on
e n t e r s se lec tion and w ag e e q ua ti o ns.
Educa ti on is a cruci al v ariable in all these s tudi es, not o nl y for i den ti ￿ca ti on , but a l so
as a dete rm i na n t of sec to ral c ho i ce. Nearly all studie s ￿nd that a high l ev el of e du c at i on
i nc reas e s signi￿c an tl y the p robab i li t yo f w orki ng in the pu bl ic sec to r. W e argue, h o w ev e r,
that t h e treatm en t of educati o n in all t he s e s tudi es is pro bl em atic . Since m os t o c cupations
are not equall ya v ail ab l ei nb o t hs e ctors , o ne should ex pe ct that h um an capital i n the t w o
sectors is not readil y trans f era bl e and sp ec i￿c o ccupations in b o th sec to rs re quire s p ec i￿c
t y pe so fe duca ti on . It is there fo re li k e ly tha t i ndivi dua l sm ee t the sec to r d e ci si o n together
with part of thei re du c at i o nal c ho i ce . I n other w ords, an indiv idua l w ho w an ts som e
oc cupa ti o n in the publ ic sector, m a yc h oos e t h e ne cessary e du c at i o n sim ultaneous l y .W e
t here fo re e ndo geniz e education. W e ￿n d that e xog e ne it y o f this v ariable in the sel ecti on
eq ua ti o n is stro ngly re jecte d. This c hang e s the concl us i o ns a b out the e ￿e c t o f educati on on
sectoral c ho i ce. I ta l so que st i on s the use of educ at i o n as iden tifyi ng de vic e. W e ￿nd tha t
the a ssum ption of e xog e neit yo fe duca ti on in the w age re gr e ss i on s l eads to a do wn w ar d3
bias o f the educati o nal co e ￿ci en ts.
F oll o wi ng H a rtog a nd Oos te rb e ek (19 93), w e incl ude ho urs w ork e da sar e g r ess or in
the w ag e e quation. H o w ev er, w e allo w ho urs of w ork to b e endog e no us. Aga i n, w e￿ n d
t h a te xog e ne it y is s trong l y reje cted.
In a l l studie su s i ng s wi tc hi ng regress i o ns, the s t ru c tura l sel ecti o n equation is estim ated
with the cu r r en t predic ted w a ge di￿ere n tial as additi o nal regresso r. The und e rlyi ng as-
sum ption is th at indiv iduals m a yc hang e se ctors at an y poi n ti nt i m e. H o w ev er, w eh a v e
a rg ue d alre a dy that the dec ision to join a sector is o fte n not eas i ly re v ersi ble. It then
sho ul d b e seen a s a l o ng- t erm e d dec ision, bas e do na c o m pa r iso n of e xp e cted li feti m ei n-
com e s. W e construct a li fe c ycl ew age di￿ere n tial a nd all o wt h e sectoral c ho i ce to de p end
on b oth the curre n t and the li fe c ycl ew ag e di ￿e ren ti al . Our em piric al r e su l ts do no t
una m bi g uous l y indic at e wh i c h of the t w om eas ure st oc ho ose.
Fi n all y , w ec om pa re c o nditi on al and unconditi o nal w ag e di ￿e ren ti al sb e t w een sectors,
using sim ulations. W e sho w that predic tions di￿er b et w een m o del sw h i c h d o and do no t
tak e sector sel ecti on i n to accoun t. The g e neral c o ncl us i o n sa b o u td i ￿e rences i n conditi o nal
and unconditi o nal w age di￿eren tials, a pp ear to b e ra the r ro bust w i th resp e ct to the other
sp e ci￿c at i o n as sum pti o ns.
The pa p er i s structure da s f o l lo ws. In the ne xt secti on w eg i v e a sho rt o v ervi ew o n
the publi c a nd the priv ate sector in Germ an y and d i scuss the data . Sec tion 3 descri be s
t h e e c o n om etri cm o del . The r esults are discussed i n sec tion 4. Secti o n 5 giv es som e
concl us i o ns.
2 Ins titutional B ac k g round and Da ta
Publ ic an d Pri v ate Sec tor i nG e rm an y
The p ubl ic sector in Ge rm an yd i stinguishes b et w een t w ot yp es of e m plo y ee s: c i vi ls e rv an t s
p r o pe r ( Be am te ) and blue a nd white collar publi c sec to r e m plo y ee s . Civ il s e rv an ts are
usua l ly a pp oin te d for l ife tim e after a n ini tial pro bation p eri o d. Their righ ts a re regulated
b yl a w, and they a re e xcl ud e d from colle cti v eb a r g aini ng . Civi l serv an ts inc lude tho se
atta c hed to the essen ti a l func tions o f the sta te (de fense, p o l ice force ,l a w and order) a nd
accoun t for ab o ut 41% of all sta te em plo y ees. Othe r sta te em plo y ees ha v eal ess sp ec ial
rel at ion shi pw i th the state. Thei rw orking con tracts m a yw el lb et e m p o rary .T h e ir ri gh t s
are regulated b y nego ti ated a gree m en ts b et w ee nu n i o ns and em pl o y e rs , a s i n the priv ate
sector. They hav e the righ tt o n e g otiate w a ges. Stil l, alt h ough civ il s e rv an t s ar e n ot
all o w ed to g e ta c tiv el yi n v olv ed i nw ag e neg oti at i o ns, civ il s e rv an ts ’ w ag e incre a ses are
stro ngly li nk e d to the results of w age negotiations o f o t he r publi c sec to r em pl o y e es. The
t y p e of w o rk don e b y civ il serv an ts and other sta te e m plo y ees is no t v e ry d i ￿e ren t, ex cept
for s om e jo bs reserv ed for c ivi l serv an ts o nl y .P a y scale s are the sam e and apply to a l l4
publi cs e ctor w ork ers at the federal, sta te and l o cal le v e l (see Brandes et al , 19 90). W e
sha l l not di st i ng ui sh the t w oc at e g orie s of p ubl ic sec to r em plo y ees in the em piri cal w ork.
Co m pa re d with the priv ate sector, en tra nc e to the publi c sec t o ri sm ore form ali ze da n d
bas e d on educational c erti ￿c at e s (see Bri nkm ann, 197 6). In the publi cs e cto r, e m plo y ee s
rec ei v es p e cial training not only for the o c cupa ti on as su c h, bu t for e ac hd i ￿ ere n tp o s ti n
thei rc ar e er group . As a co nseq uence of this s ubstan tial am ou n t of job-s p ec i￿c education,
stro ng ti es dev el op b e t w ee ne m plo y ee a nd e m plo y er a nd e n trance in to the publi c sec to r
from p ri v at e sec to r o cc u pations i s di￿c ult. M or e o v e r, ag e regulations restri ct e n trance to
ci vi l serv an to c c up ati o ns (see Brandes e t al, 1 988 ). Bl os sfel d and Be c k er (1 989 ) describ e
the v ar i ou s r e s tri cti o n so nc ha nges b et w e en sec to rs. They conclude tha t instituti o nal
constra i n ts h i nder c h anges b et w een sect o rs in b oth direc tions considerably , partic ul arly
with i ncreasing seniori t y . This i s con￿rm ed b y the lo wn um be rs o f tra nsit ion s: i n eac ho f
the y ears 19 84 til l 19 87, less than o ne p e rcen to f a l le m plo y ee sc hang ed s e ctor. The publ ic
sector in Germ an ye xpan de d rapidly i n the 6 0’s and 70’s. Th e e x pa nsion w as m ai nly
i n duc ed b y a n exte ns i o n of the w elfare sta te and the co rre sp onding e xpa nsion o f so ci al ,
educ at i o nal an d m e dical serv ice s. B et w een the 1 950 an d 19 92 the n um b e ro fe m plo y ee s
i n the publi cs e ctor inc reas e d from 2.2 M io to m ore th an 4.95 Mi o.
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The share of publ ic
sector em plo y ees o n the total n um be r o f salary earners incre a sed from 12 . 5 p erce n ti n
1 9 6 5 t o 1 8 p erce n t in 19 80 a nd sta bi li zed sinc e then a t ab o ut 20 p erce n t. I n 1 98 5, 82 . 9
p erce n t o f all publ ic sector em pl o y e es w ere em plo y ed full -t i m e .
T h e s o c i a l securi t y system for civ il s e rv an t si ss l igh tl y di￿eren t from tha t a pply ing to
other publi cs e ctors em pl o y e es. Com pared wi th public sec to r em pl o y ee s, p ri v at e sec to r
em plo y ees a re sim il ar l ys e cured in c as e o f i ll ne ss . Ho w ev e r, i n case o f in v al idit y ,d e at h an d
seniori t y , p ubl ic sec to r em pl o y e es are subs tan ti al ly b etter protecte d than pri v a te sec to r
em plo y ees. F or instance, w hi le p ensi o n so fc i vil serv an ts a m ou n t t o a b o u t8 0p e r cen to f
t h ei r latest net inc om e, a nd p e ns i o ns of o ther publ ic e m plo y ees ev e n t o abou t 1 0 5 perce n t,
priv ate s e ctor em plo y ees who ha v ep a i d thei r con tri b uti o n st ot h e p e ns i on sc hem e for 45
y ears , o nl y rece iv e abou t 7 2 perce n t o f thei r latest n e t incom e (see K ra use, 198 1).
Data a nd V ar i ab l e s
The em piri cal an al ysis is ba se do n d a t a from the Ge rm an So cio-Eco nom i cP anel ,w h i c h
i nc ludes ab o ut 6 00 0 househo l ds. 450 0 of the se h a v e househo l d heads with G e rm an na-
ti o nali t y , 15 00 with fo re ign nationa l it y . Thi ss t u dy is restrict ed to the ￿rs t sub sam pl e.




Al ln um b e rs re fer to W es t G er m an y only .
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W ec o ns truc t m ost v ari ables from t he ￿rs t w a v e whi ch pro vides i nform ation ab out actu al lab or m ark et
exp erienc e, a ll o wing u s to disting ui sh b et w ee n co hort a nd e x per i e nce e￿ ec ts in the selec tio n equati on.
F rom the thi rd w a v ew e obtai ni nform ation ab out t he f am i ly bac kground and pa re n tal c haract eristics
when th e i ndivi du a lw a s1 5y ears old.5
restri ct the a naly si st o m ale i nd i vi d uals who a r e in dep e nden te m pl o ym e n t a t the ti m e
of the in tervi ew. T able A1 in the app e ndix de sc rib es the v ariables used for the ana l ysis.
Af ter e xcl ud i ng a l li ndivi dua l s with m issing v al ues i n rel ev an tv ariables (se e table A2),
the s am pl e used for the presen t analysis re duces to 14 28 o bserv ations, with 972 e m plo y ed
i n the pri v a te sec to r and 45 6 in the public s e ctor.
Sum m ary s tati st i cs are g i v e ni n t a b l eA 3 . The ￿rst t w o colum ns gi v em eans and, if
app r o pri a te, sta ndard errors for the p o ole d sam pl e o f priv ate and publi c sector em pl o y e es.
The other c ol um ns refe rt o t h e sub sam pl es o f priv ate and pub l ic em pl o y e es. The e du c at i on
l ev e lv ariable is o rde red, with v alues 0 to 5. I t is constructed from det ai led i nfo rm at i on
a b out e du c at i o nal ba c kgro und. F rom ta bl eA 3, it is c lear that publ ic sector e m plo y ee s
ha v e a stro nger educationa l ba c kgroun d tha n pri v a te sector e m plo y ees, on a v erag e . Publ ic
sector em plo y ees a re s om e w hat o l der a nd sli gh tly m or e e xp e rie nc ed tha n priv ate sec to r
em plo y ees. Priv ate s e ctor em pl o y e es w ork, on a v erag e, 8 h ours p e rm on th m o re tha n
publi cs e ctor em pl o y ee s, wh e reas thei r ho url y earn i ng s are lo w e r.
A n um b e r of f am ily bac k g round v ariable s are used. Th e se r e ￿e ct the lab or m ar k et
sta tus of the father when the c hi ld w as a ged 15 , whethe r the m other partic ipated in
the lab or m ark et or not, a ge o f fath e r and m o ther when the i nd i vi d ual w as b orn, a nd
educ at i on l ev el o f f a ther a nd m o ther. W e ￿nd, for exam pl e, that fathers o f tho se in the
publi cs e ctor m ore o fte nw ork ed in the public se ctor than fa ther so ft h ose in the priv ate
sector.
3 Econom e tric Mo del
W e presen t the m ain features of the e m piri cal m od e l. D e ta i ls are pro vi de di n the ap p endi x.
F or e ac hi nd i vi du al, w e expl ai n the c hoic eb e t w een p ubl ic a nd priv ate sec to r w ork and the
hou r ly w ag er a t ei n the c hos e n sector. I n prev ious researc h , an im p orta n tv ariable for the
sector c ho i ce has b e en the indi vidual’ se ducation lev el .A s s a i da b o v e , this i sl ik el yt o b e
endog e no us. W e a dd an eq ua ti o n to e xplain this v ariable, i nw h i c h education l ev e ls of b o th
paren ts are the m ai ne xplanato ry v ariable s. F ollo wi ng H a rtog and Oos te rb e ek (19 93), w e
all o wt h e w ag e ra t e to dep end up on hours w or k ed. Si nce hours w ork e d, ac cord i ng to
l abor supp l y theory ,m a y dep end up on the w age ra te ,w ea l lo w fo r endog e neit y o f hou r s
w ork e d, a nd ad d an ho urs eq u ati o n. T he m o del th us con si s t so f￿ v e equations , e xplaini ng
educ at i on l e v e l, the c hoic eb e t w e en p ri v ate a nd public s e ctor (sel ec tion), hours of w ork,
and w age ra te s for the pu bl ic and pri v at e se ctor.6
Education Lev e l
Education le v e ls are co ded fro m 0 to 5, i na s c ending order (see sect ion 3 ) .A n a ppropriate
















f o r (j =0 ; ::: ; 5) ; (1 )
where E denotes the educ at i o nal lev el atta i ned, and E
￿
is al at en tv ar i ab l e. The v ec to r
of e xplana tory v ariables X
E
con tains inform ation c o nce rning the paren ts (s e e estim at i on
r e s u l t s i n ne xt sec tion for detail s ). Assum ptions on the e rro r term u
E
are g i v e n b e lo w. The
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a re p aram ete rs to b e e st i m ated.
W age R at e s
P oten ti al b efore tax e a rni ng s p er ho ur w ork e d are m o del ed fo r the p r iv ate and publ ic
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j
;j =0 ; 1 ; (2 )
where j = 0 and j =1 d e n ote the publi c and priv ate s e ctor, re spe c tiv ely . The v ec to r
DE co n ta i ns ￿v e dum m yv ar i ab l es for the ￿v e highest e duca ti on le v e ls. H denotes hou r s
w ork e d p e r fou r w e eks. E x o genous v ariable s suc ha sa g e a n de x p eri ence a re incl uded in
X
W




are g i v e n b el o w .
Sel ect ion
W em o del th e binary c h oic eb e t w e en priv ate sec to r (S = 0 ) and pub l ic s e ctor w or k ( S = 1).































i sav ec to r o f expl a nato ry v ar iab l es, i nc luding, for ex am pl e, the fa t he r’s o c cupa-
ti o nal grou p. ￿
c
ln W an d ￿
l
ln W are the curren t a nd l ife cyc le log w age di ￿ ere n tial s
7
F or notatio nal c on v en i e nce , the i nde x i ndicating the i ndivi dual i so m i tt ed throughout.7
be t w e en p oten ti a l publi c a nd priv ate sec to r w ag e rates.
8
As argued ab o v e, the sec to r
c ho i ce deci si o n is not easil y rev ersi ble. T hi si m plie s tha t indiv iduals m a y no t ba se th e ir
c hoi ce on the curre n tw a ge di￿ere n tial, but o n the discoun ted li feti m ew ag e di ￿e ren ti al :
the di￿ere nc eb e t w e en the di sc ou n ted (n e t pre sen t) v al ue o f pas t, curre n t a nd future earn-
i n gs o v e r the who l ew orking li fe. W eh a v e a ppro xi m ated the l ife cyc le w age di￿eren tial
b ya na v er a g eo fw age predic tions at v ari o us s tages of the li fe cyc le (see a pp endix).
Hours w or k ed
W e add a s truc tura l f or m e qua ti o n for h ours w or k ed:








ln W + u
H
: (4 )
He re W i st h e b e fo re tax w ag e ra te in the c hos e ns e ctor, i. e. W
0
if S = 0 an d W
1
if
S = 1. The sec to r dum m y S itsel fi si ncl ud e d to re￿ect instituti o nal di ￿e rences b et w een
the t w ot y p es of jobs.
Di s t ributi on of Error T e rm s












i sa s s u m e d t obe i nd e pe nd e n to fa l l










and m ul ti-v ariate norm al with m e an z e ro
and co v ariance m atri x￿ . B ym eans of norm ali zation, ￿(2; 2) = Va r ( u
S
)i s set equal to
one. F o r practic al p u r pos e s, u
H
i s as sum e d t ob ei nd e pe nd e n t o f the other error te rm s.
Endo genei t yo fh o u r s w ork ed th us only com es ab o ut throug h the system at i c part of the




) i s no t i den ti ￿ed. The other e lem en ts of ￿ (fo ur
v ariances a nd ￿v ec o v ar i an c es) can b e estim at e d.
Iden ti ￿c at i on
F or m o del iden ti ￿cation, w en e ed v arious e xcl us i on restric tions . I n the w age eq u ati o ns,
w e excl ude all p aren ta l c h aracteri stics, th us as sum i ng that correl at i on be t w een abil it ya n d
obse rv e d paren tal c ha racte ristic s only com e s ab out throug h sel ecti o n a nd education lev el .
In the se lec tion equation, w ee xcl ud e education lev el s of the paren ts to iden tify e nd ogenei t y
of education, but w ed o r e ta i n th e pa re n ts’ o ccupationa l g roup v ar i ab l es. T oi den ti fy the
i m pa c to f t h e w ag e di￿eren ti al, w ee x clude a ctual exp erie nce. Onl y tho se o v e riden t ifyi ng
restri ctions w ere im po s e dw h i c hw ere not rej ecte db y the data. An e xcepti on i s the hou r s
of w ork equation, whic hw e co nsi de r a s auxil iary only a nd do not giv ei tm uc he m phasis.
8
T o b e pre cise, w e use d the sys tem ati c part of th e l og w age di ￿ ere n ti als o nly . See app e ndi xf o r de tai ls.
9
In the a pp endix i ti s expla ined that endogene i t y of exp erienc e induc ed b y e ducatio nl ev e l di￿e renc es
i sa llo w ed for.8
Esti m ati on
The m o del i s estim at e db ym axi m um li k e li h ood . T he hourly w a ge ra te and ho urs o f
w ork are obs e rv e d fo r all indi viduals in the sam pl e. The l ik el iho o d co n tributi o n of eac h
i nd i vidual c a n b e written as the biv ariate densit yo fw a ge rate (i n the o bserv ed sec to r)
and ho urso fw ork, tim es the conditional proba bi li t y o f the observ e d educati on l ev el a nd
sector c ho i ce, giv en w ag e rate and hours of w or k .S e e a pp endix f o r detail s.
4 E s t i m a t ion Re sults
W e consider a v arie t yo fd i ￿e ren ts p e ci ￿c at i o ns. Di￿erenc es b et w een m o dels m ainl y relate
to di￿eren tz e ro r estricti on s on ￿ and o n c oe ￿ cie n ts of ex pl an atory v ariable s , the incl us i on
of the curre n to rt h e l i fe cy cle w ag e d i ￿e ren ti a l in the sel ec tion equation. T able 1 presen t s
the m od e ls w eh a v e esti m ated and thei rl ik eli h ood v al ues. Lik eli h ood r at i o tests ba sed o n
this tab l el e a d to the f ol lo wing c on c lusions .
[T able 1 ab out h e re]












) = 0 )
i s s trong l yr e jec ted.
10
Ex o genei t y o f education le v e li sam ain tai ne d as sum pti on i n the





= 0) i s a l so stro ngly reje cted, sug gesting that all o wing for e ndo genei t y o f hou r s
w ork e d i s a signi￿c an ti m pro v e m en t com pared to , fo r exam pl e, H a rtog and Oos te rb e ek
(19 93). Third, w e ￿nd that nei ther the curren t no r the l ife cyc le w a ge di￿eren tial are
signi￿can ti n t he se le ction equation. The ’re duced form ’m o del in whic hw a ge di￿ere n-
ti al s are no t i nclude di s not rejec ted a gainst m o del sw i th one or b o t hw age di￿eren tials.
Moreo v er, once th e w ag e d i ￿e ren ti al s are i nclude d, the educational dum m i es do not a dd
an ythi ng .
11
Fi na l ly ,w e ￿nd that the sel ecti vit y problem is alw a y s pre se n t: the h yp othesi s













= 0 ) is stro ngly rej ecte d , no m atter whether w e all o w for e n dogenei t yo fe du c at i on an d
hou r sw ork e d or not. W ee x am ine these ￿ndings in m ore detail b el o w. W e fo cus the di s-
cussion of the para m eter estim at e s o n the m os t g e ne ra l m o del (m o del 1). F o r the sel ecti on
eq ua ti o n an d the w ag e e quations , w ea l so presen t som e alter n ativ e esti m ates.
Hours W ork e d and Educa t ion
T ab l e2r e p orts the resul ts o f the education and the hours equation in m o del 1 . In the
eq ua ti o n expl ai ni ng the indiv idua l s’ e ducation le v e l, b oth the fa the r’s and the m other’ s
10
Unl e ss s tated othe rwi se , w e use a signi ￿c ance lev el of 5 p er ce n t( t w o-tai led te st) .
11
If w ei nc l ud e e ducatio nl ev e l itse l f (tr eate d a s a cardinal v aria ble), w e ￿nd the sam e re sult: a t-v al ue
of -0. 3.9
educ at i on h a v eas i gn i ￿c an t p o siti v e e￿ec t, with t h at of the father b eing m or e i m p ortan t.
The o c cupa ti o nal c at e g ory of the fath e ri sa l so i m p o rtan t: i f the father w as a ci vil serv an t,
this has a strong l yi m ro v es education (no f a ther o r father i s blue c ol lar w ork e ri st h e
ref erence g roup). Age i si n tro duc ed as a p o l yno m ial of order ￿v et oa c coun t for coho rt
e￿ec ts in a ￿ex ibl ew a y . F igure 1 sh o ws th e probab i li t y of a high educ at i on l e v e la sa
functi o n of age (other v ariable sa r e s e te q ua l t o t he ir sam pl em e a ns). I t a pp ears tha t
educ at i o nal a c hie v e m en ti s rel ativ ely l o w for those w ho rece iv ed the ir education duri ng
the second w or l dw ar .
[T able 2 ab out h e re]
F rom the hours equation, i t app e ar s t h at hours w ork ed for pa y is neg ati v el y related
to log w ag e s. Th i si sat y pical incom e e￿ect . Hours w ork e df o r p a y are l o w er i n the
publi c than in the priv ate se ctor. An e xplana ti o n is that pa i do v e rtim ei s less com m on
i n th e publi c than in the p r iv ate sect or . O v er the li fe c ycl e, hours w or k ed i ncrease with
ag e un ti l a b ou t ag e 38 , and dec reas e after tha t . Hous e o wners tend to w or k m o re hou r s
than re n ters, whi c h prob ably r e￿ects a ￿nanci al c o nstrain t . Th e n um b e ro fc hi ldren i s
p o siti v ely re lated t o ho urs w or k ed. T hi sm a yb er e l at e d to the fact that i n hous e ho l ds
with (m an y) c hil dr e n, the wife i sm or e l ik el yt o withdra w from the lab o r force if the
h usba nd has a com para ti v ea d v an tag e in the m ark et sector. The h u sband the nw or k s
m ore to co m pe ns ate fo r the i nc om el o ss (see Be c k er, 19 81 , c ha pter 2 ). U nexp ecte dly , the
am oun to fi n tere s t incom e has a p ositiv e a nd si gn i ￿ca n t e￿ec to nh o u r sw or k ed, whi le a
dum m yi ndic at i ng that i n tere s t inc om ei s rece iv ed has a nega ti v ei m pa c t. The l a tte ri s
s i g n i ￿ c a n t at t h e 10 p erc en tl e v e lo n l y .
S e c t o r a l Choice
In table 3, w e presen t the re su l ts for the sel ecti on e q ua ti o n in the m o st general m o del
(m o del 1, colum n1 ) a n d i nt w o alte rna ti v e sp eci ￿cations . Colum n 2 is the reduced form
m o del without w ag e di ￿e ren ti al si n the sele ction equation, but a l lo wing fo r e nd ogenei t y
(m o del 4 in table 1) of education a nd ho urs w ork e d. Co l um n3 r e fers to the p r o tot yp e
m od el i n whic h education and ho urs w ork e d a re exogeno us (m o del 1 2). The f a ther’ st yp e
of o cc u pation sub stan ti al ly i n￿u e nces the sec to r dec ision o f the o ￿s pri ng . T hose who se
father w a sac i vi l ser v an th a v e a sign i ￿can tl y higher pro babil it yt o h a v e a publi c sec to r
job thant h os e who se father had a bl ue-collar p ri v at e sec to r job (the refere nce g roup).
Tho se w hose father w a s sel f-em pl o y ed o r had a white-coll ar job in the priv ate sec to r ha v e
an i n term ediate p o si tion i n thi sr e spe c t.
[T able 3 ab out h e re]
In all m ode ls presen ted, w ei ncl u de education as a seri es of dum m yv ariables. In
the g e neral m o del , education l ev el pla y sn or o l e fo r sector c hoice . In the reduc ed form
m o del, th e educ at i on v ariable s a re join tl ys i gn i ￿c an t. Com pariso n w i th the gene ra l m o del
sug gests that in thi s cas e , the negativ e signs of so m e of the dum m yv ar i ab l es sim ply10
re￿e ct the w ag e e ￿e c t. In the ￿rst t w om o del s , the c o rre lation co e ￿ci en tb e t w een e rro r s
i n education eq ua ti o n and sel ecti on equation i ss i gn i ￿can t. Ex o genei t y o f education i s
rej ecte d , indic at i ng that e duca ti on al c ho i ce s and sec to r c ho i ces are m ade s i m ul tan e o usl y ,
as susp ec ted in the discussion i ns e ction 1 . If w ed on o ta l lo wf o re n dogenei t y( m o del
12 ), education le v e l dum m ie s a re join tl ys i gn i ￿c an t at the 5 p erce n tl ev el . Th e para m eter
esti m ates in m od e l 12 strong l y di￿er from thos e in m od e l 4. The p o si tiv e rel at i on b et w een
educ at i on l ev el a nd sel ecti on i n to the p ubl ic s e ctor is m uc h s tronger. This re m ains the c as e





to zero. The p os i tiv e e￿ec to fe du c at i o n found in other em pi ric al st ud i es m i gh tt h us b e
due to uno bserv ed factors, correl at e dw i th b oth education lev el a nd sel ecti o n, instead o f
to e ducation l ev el i ts e lf.
This result q uestions the conclusions dra wn i n o the r stu di es ab out the e￿ec to fe du-
cation on sec to ral c hoic e. M or e o v e r, it s uggests tha t m an ye stim ates of w ag e e quations
m i g h t al so b e bi a sed, s i nce co r recti o n for sel ecti vit yi s ofte ni den ti ￿ed throug h the u se o f
di￿ere n t spe c i￿cations of the educational v ar i ab l es in s e le ction a nd w ag e e q ua ti o ns.
W en o w turn to the w a ge di￿ere n tial. Al l stud i es u se the curr en t predic ted w ag e
d i ￿ e r e n t i al as a ddi tiona l regress or. T oa l lo w for the p ossibil it y tha t sec to ral c hoice m a y
b eal o ng-term e d dec ision, w e incl ude b o t h the c urren t a nd the e xp e cted li feti m ew ag e
di￿ere n tial. I nm o del 1, b o t hw ag e di￿ere n tials ha v e the exp ec ted p o si tiv es i g n, but are
i ns i gn i ￿c an t. If one of the w ag e di ￿e ren ti al si sr em o v ed from the eq ua ti o n, the other re -
m ain s po si tiv e and i ns i gn i ￿can t( m o dels 2 and 3 in ta bl e 1). The curren tw ag e di￿eren tial
has a som ewhat l a rger t-v al ue tha n the li fe cyc le one. Our rather crude w a y of appro xi -
m ati n g the l ife cyc le w ag e di￿ere n tial, igno ri ng , fo r exam pl e, di ￿ ere nces in unem plo ym en t
ri sk s, or b e ne￿t o r p ension ri gh ts , cou l d expl ai n thi s.
Another expl a nation c ou l d b e the lac k of iden tify ing re s tri cti on s on t h e se lec tion e qua-
ti on . If, for e xam ple ,w ei m p o se tha t education l ev el en te rs li nearly in t h e sel ecti on
eq ua ti o n o r excl ude age, b o th w a ge di￿eren tials b ecom e signi￿can t. W e conclude tha t o ur
￿ndings in this re spe c t a re no t robust with resp ect to the c hos e ns p e c i￿cati o n. Our result s
sug gest tha t the c ho i ce of iden tify ing re s tri cti o ns is cruci a l a nd could expl ai nd i ￿e rence s
be t w e en the v ar i o us studie s in the li terature. F o r exam pl e, Hartog a nd Oosterb eek (1 993 )
￿nd a p os i tiv e a nd stro ngly signi￿can ti m pa ct of the curre n tw a ge di￿eren tial. They i n-
cl ude y ears of sc h ool ing a nd general e duca t ion i n the sel ecti on e qua ti on , v e rsu s dum m ie s
for education le v e ls a tt ai ne d in the w ag e e q ua ti o ns, th u s adding a ddit ion al iden t ifyi ng
constra i n ts. V an Ophem (199 3), al so us i ng Dutc h da ta, ￿ nds a n insigni￿c an ti m pact o f
the w ag e di ￿ ere n ti al .H i s ide n tify ing re s tri cti o ns a re m uc hw eak er: o nl y ten ure i s exc luded
from the sele cti o n equation.
In ￿ gure2 ,w eh a v es k e tc he d the e stim ated pro babil it yo f w orki ng i n the public sec to r
as a funct ion o f age and education lev el for m od e l1 . T he pub l ic sector prob abil it yi s
highest for the t w ol o w est educ at i on l ev els and fo r the highest lev el .
1 2
The publi c sec to r
12
As e xp ec ted f ro m table 3, the ￿ndings for m o del 4 are si m il ar. Using m od el 12 ,h o w ev er , w ould l ea d11
proba bil it y gra duall yi ncreases with age for the y oung er coho rts, but dro ps strong l y for the
oldest coho rt. A sw e sha l l see b e lo w, this ca nnot b e ex pl ained fro m the w age di ￿e ren ti al .
I t is proba bl y a coho rt e￿ e ct. Note that thos e in th e oldest age cohort sta rte d their career
just a fte r the se co nd w orld w ar.
W age E quations
Estim ati o n results for p ubl ic and p r iv ate s e ctor w ag e e q ua ti on s ar e gi v e ni nt a b l es 4 a nd
5. A g ain, w e presen t three sp ec i￿cations: the gene ra l m o del (m od e l 1), the m o del in
whic h e du c a ti on l e v e l a nd hours w ork ed are exogeno us (m od e l 9), and the OLS result s
(m o del 1 2). In m o del 1 , exog e neit y of educ at i on i n the w age eq ua ti on i s rejec ted for the
priv ate sector, but not for the publi cs e ctor. B oth correl at i o n co e ￿ci en ts a re nega ti v e.
An ex plana ti o n for thi sm igh tb ei ncom ple te m easurem e n t o f the educ at i on l e v e l. A
m e a surem en te r ro r on e du c at i on l ev el c om bined with the p o si tiv ei m pa ct of education o n
w ag e s m a y e xplain b o th the nega ti v e correlati o n and the do wn w ard b i as of the estim ated
i m pa c t of education i nm od e ls 9 a nd 1 2, for the s am e reaso ns as in a sim ple line ar m o del .
[T able s 4, 5 ab out her e]
In m o de ls 1a n d9 ,w e ￿nd that the correl ation b et w e en errors in sele cti on an d w ag e
e q u at i on i si nsigni￿can t fo r the priv ate s e ctor, but p os i tiv ea n ds t ro ngly signi￿can t fo r the
publi c sector.
13
Thi s re inforces the p o si tiv e sele cti o n e￿ect of the w age di￿eren tial. A long
the l ines of Ro y (19 51), it indi cates tha t the m ean w a ge of tho se w ho ha v ec hos e nt o w ork
i n the p ubl ic se ctor is larg e r tha n the e xp e cted publ ic sec to r w age of a n arbitrary indi vidual
with the s am e o bserv ed c hara c teristi cs. W e return to this in the next subsecti on . P os i tiv e
sel ecti on i n to the publi cs e ctor, bu t no s e lec tion i n to t h e pri v at e se ctor, is al s o fo und b y
v an O p he m (19 93 ) and Hartog and Oo sterb ee k (1 993 ). V an der Ga ag and Vi jv e rb e rg
(19 88) ￿nd a p o sit iv es e le ction in to b oth s e ctors .
The e￿ e ct o f l o g hours w ork ed o n the ho url yw ag e r at ei ss i gn i ￿c an tly nega t iv ef o r
b o th s e ctors, with e lastici t y b elo w o ne. It incre a ses w he n endog e neit yo fh o u r sw or k ed
i s ign ored. L i k e Hartog and Oosterb eek (1 993 ) w e ￿nd that the e￿ e ct i s stro nger i n the
publi c tha n in the priv ate sec to r. An ex plana ti o n could b e m eas ure m en te rro rs in hou r s
w ork e d, s i nce w ag e r at e s a re com puted a s the ratio of m on thl y earnings and ho urs w ork ed.
F ora l l spe c i￿cations and b oth sec to rs, the w ag e i nc reas e sm o noto ni call yw i th e du c at i on
l e v e l . In the g e neral m o del, the i m pact of education le v e li s strong e r tha n i n the m o del s
whic h d o no t all o w for endo genei t y of education.
W eh a v e incl uded a quadra ti c func tion of b oth age and actua l ex pe rienc e. I ncl ud i ng
ag e term s a part from e xp e rie nc et e rm sl e a ds to a signi￿can ti m pro v em en t of the li k e li hoo d .
to the c o nc l us i on that the p roba bil it y of publi c sec tor em pl o ym en ti n cre a s es with ed ucati on lev el.
13
The sam e res ul ts w ere found wi th othe r m od el s all o wi ng f or the se c orre l ati ons ( m od el s 2 - 8) and
re m ained v ali d when the s yste m atic part o f the e q ua tions w a s chang ed b y ,f or exam pl e , us i ng di ￿e re n t
ag e, ex pe ri e nce, or educ a ti on functions.12
The a ge v ariables m a y re￿e ct b oth co hort a nd li fe cyc le e ￿e c ts. Surprisingly , age pla ys no
role i n the pub l ic s e ctor, but i ss i gn i ￿can t in the pri v ate sec to r. D i ￿e rence sb e t w een the
three m od e ls are qui te sm all in thi s resp e ct. In ￿gure 3, w eh a v es k etc hed the e xp e cted
w ag e rates i n b o th sectors as a functi o n o f education l ev el an d a ge. Exp erie nce is re placed
b y its b e stl i ne a r pre dicti on , gi v en a ge and education le v e l. Other v ariable sa r e s e t equal
to their sam ple m eans. P ubl ic sec to r w a ges inc reas e w i th a ge, w hi le p ri v at e sector w ag e s
sho wam uc h ￿a tte r pattern. F or y o ung w ork e rs, the priv ate se ctor pa ys m uc h b etter tha n
the publi cs e ctor. F o r the oldest ag e grou p, the d i ￿e rence i sn e gl igibl e.
W age Di ￿e ren tials
W e cons i der unc o nditi on al an d cond i tional w a ge pre dicti on s a c co r di ng to the estim ated
m o dels. The unco ndi tiona l (pu bl ic or priv ate sector) w a ge predi cti o n is de￿ned a s the
(a v erag e ) predic ted v alue o f the (publi co rp r i v at e )w ag e ra te for an a rbi tra r y indi vidual
i n the p opulation. The conditi o nal w ag e predic tion is the w e igh ted p o pul at i on a v erag e o f
the w a ge predic tions of all i nd i viduals in the sa m ple, where the w eigh ts are the estim ated
sector prob abil iti es (s e e, e.g. ,H ec km an, 19 90, for a di sc us si on of v arious d e ￿niti o ns).
T o tak e acc o un t of th e f ul l structure of the e rro r term s, w eh a v e com puted the w ag e
predi ctions u si n gas i m ul at i o n of the com ple te m od e l. See a pp endix for detail s. The
resul ts for a l lm od e ls in ta bl e 1 are rep o rte di n table 6 .
[T able 6 ab out h e re]
The ￿rs t thre e colum n s ref er to w ages in the priv ate sec to r, the last t hr e e colum ns
to w ag e s in the pub l ic sector. The ￿ r s t a nd fourth colum ns presen t pre dicte d log w ag e s
i nt h e t w o sect or s f o r an a v erage i nd i vidual (unc ondition al ). Ac co rdi ng to all m od e ls,
the p r iv ate sec to r p a y sb e tter than the p ubl ic sector, on a v erag e .F or the priv ate sec to r
w ag e ,a l lm o dels yi el ds i m il ar pre dicti on s. F or t h e pu bl ic s e ctor w ag e h o w ev er, di ￿e rence s
b et w e en the m o del s are m uc hl a rger. In pa rti cular, the m o del si n whic hs e lec tivi t yi s








)= 0 ) y i eld higher publ ic
sector w ag e pre di cti o ns tha n the oth e rm o del s, with di￿erenc es of m ore tha n 20 p erce n t.
The o the rc ol um ns refer to c on di t ional w age predic tions. C olum n 2 refe rs to w a ges in
the priv ate sec to r of an indiv idual wh o ha s c h osen to w ork i n the pri v a te sec to r. These
predi ctions are si m il ar for all m ode ls. Al lm o del s a re able to repro duce the a v e ra ge log
w ag e rate in the p ri v ate se cto r rather w ell . Sim il ar l y , col um n6r e fers to pub l ic sec to r
w ag e s of publi c sector w ork e rs . Aga i n, a l lm o dels re p ro duce the a v erag e log w age in the
publi c sector reaso nably w el l. T he m os t i n tere sting predic tions are those in c ol um ns 3
and 5, whic hh a v e no observ ed sa m pl ee q uiv alen t. Colum n 3 refe rs to the w ages tha t
publi c sector w ork ers could ha v e rec eiv ed when they w ou l dh a v ew or k ed i n the priv ate
sector. Co l um n 5 presen t s pot e n tial publi cs e ctor w a ges o f pri v ate sec to r w ork e rs . These
colum ns rev eal m uc hl ar g er di￿ere nc es b et w een the v ar i ou s m o del s than colum ns 2 an d
6. Co m pa re d to tho se in the m ost g e neral m o del (m o del 1 ), p oten ti al publi cs e ctor w ag e s13
of p r iv ate sector w or k ers in the m o del not a l lo wing for e ndo genei t y of education lev el o r
hou r sw or k ed (m o d e l 9 ) a r e abou t 9 p e rcen tl o w e r( c ol um n 2). Surpri si ng l y , the m os t
g e neral m od e l a nd the m os t r e stricti v em o del s( m od e ls 11 and 1 2) lead to v ery sim il ar
predi ctions of p oten ti a l publi cs e ctor w ag e s. Thi s is, ho w ev e r , no t t he c as e f or pot e n tial
priv ate sector w a ges o f publi c sec to r w ork e rs (c ol um n 5). H ere m ode ls 1 a nd 9 yi eld
sim il a r results, w hi le the o utc om es of the m ost re st r icti v em o dels exc eed tho se o f m o del
1b ym ore tha n 35 p e rcen t.
A com m on observ ation of all m o dels is that pre di cte d un c o n ditional w ag es a re higher
i n the pri v a te than in th e publi cs e cto r :a n a v erage i ndivi dua l faces hi gh e rw ag e pros p ect s
i n the pri v a te than in the publi c sec to r (colum ns 1 and 4). Thos e who s e le cted the m sel v e s
i n to the priv ate se ctor (colum ns 2 an d 5 ) are those w i th l o w er p oten ti al w a ges i n bot h
s e c t o r s. T hi s is du e to b oth obs e rv e d an d uno bserv ed c hara c teri st i cs: from ￿g ures 2 a nd 3
for exam pl e, w e con c lude that a ge i sn e g ativ el y correl at e dw i th se lec tion in to the priv ate
sector, but p o siti v e ly with w ages in b oth sect o rs. A cc o rdi n gly , those who w ork i n the
publi cs e ctor d o b e tter in b oth sectors than th e a v erage indiv idual.
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No w consider t h e conditional w ag e di￿eren tials. T hose i nt h e priv ate sec to r w ould
b e m uc h w ors e o￿ in the public sec to r (co l um ns 2 and 5). A ccording to m o del 1 , the
di￿ere nce w ould b e ab out 3 0 p e rcen t, on a v e ra ge. T he di￿erence is m uc hs m all er in
m o dels tha t do not a l lo w fo r sel ecti vit y (in m ode l 12 , ab o ut 6 p erce n t). T he e ndo genous
sel ecti on i m pli es that tho se i n the publi c sec to r are those with, on a v e ra ge, the sm all er
w ag e di￿ere n tial b et w ee n the t w os e ctors . Th us s e le ction w orks i n the ’ righ t’ dire ction.
This resul t is stable a cross sp ec i￿cati o ns. F or thos e wh o actuall yw ork i n the publ ic
sector, the a v erag e w age di￿eren tial in m od e l 1 is le s s tha n 7 p erc en t (colum ns 3 and 6).
F or m o dels 7 and 9 , th i sw ag e di￿eren tial has the opp osite s i gn . I fw ag e sw ere the only
cri teri o n fo r sector c hoice , the n the results f or m od e l 1 indic a te that the c h oic eo fm an y
publi c sec to r w or k ers i s n ot rational. H o w ev er, c ho o si ng the public sector i s no t pure ly
bas e do nw age con si derations . F or e xa m ple, job se curit y ,e n ti tle m en ts to unem plo ym en t
b ene￿ts, p ensi on r i gh ts, and m an y other non- m on e ta ry job c h aracteri stics pla y a ro l e. In
secti on 2, w e hav e disc u ssed so m ed i ￿e rence si n b ene￿t a nd p e ns i on en titl em e n ts b et w een
the sectors that m a y com p ensa te the w ag e di s adv an ta ge from c ho osing a pu bl ic sec to r
oc cupa ti on .
[ T able 7a b out h e re]
W ag e ad v an tag es b et w een sec to rs are often f o und to v ar y ac ro ss educati o nal c a tegorie s
or a ge groups . V an d e rG a a ga n dV i jv erb erg (1 98 2), for i ns tance , ￿nd tha t unconditi o nal
ex pe cted w ag e si n the pri v at e se ctor a re hi g h for tho se with lo w educ at i o n, but l o w
for those wi th hi g h education. Harto g a nd Oo sterb ee k (199 3) ￿nd tha t pub l ic sec to r
o c cupa ti on s h a v eh i gh e rw a ge pro sp ects for all educationa l g roups , while v an Ophem
(19 93) rep orts tha t the un c o ndi tiona l w a ge adv an ta ge of the publi c sector dim ini sh e s
14
Ma n ye m piri ca l s tu d i es i gnore t he se l e ctio n e ￿ec ts of obs erv ed cha ra ct er i st i c s and f ocu s o n l yo n
unobse rv ed c harac terist i cs .14
with incre a sing ag e .T ab l e 7 presen ts conditi o nal and unconditi o nal log w a ges for di ￿e ren t
educ at i o nal an d ag e group s for m o del 1. The results s p eak for the m selv es.
T ab l es 6 a nd 7 are ba sed up on the p oin t esti m ates. I n table 8, w e prese n t 9 0 p erc en t
con￿dence i n terv als fo r the w ag e di ￿ ere n ti al s , taki ng accoun t o f the errors i n the para m -
ete re st i m ates (s e e a pp endix ). The lef th and panel sho ws that the a v erag e unconditi o nal
publi cs e ctor w ag e s are si gn i ￿ca n tly (at the t w o-s i ded 1 0 p erce n t lev el )l o w er tha n a v e r-
ag e unconditi o nal priv ate s e ctor w ages for all e ducation and ag e gro ups. Di￿erenc es are
dim ini sh i ng w i th ag e , and lo w e s t fo r the l o w est e duca t ion al g r o ups. The latter c o n￿rm s
wha t w es a wi n￿ g u r e3f o ra r e presen tativ ei nd i vi d ual.
[T able 8 ab out h e re]
The m i dd l e and righ than d panel in ta bl e 8 refe r to conditi o nal di ￿e ren ti al s. F or a l l ag e
and education catego ri es, w e ￿ nd that thos e in the p r iv ate sector w ould b e signi￿c an tly
w orse o ￿ i n the publi c sector, o n a v erag e. Ac cording to th e ri gh tha nd pa ne l, tho se with
l ow e du c at i on l ev el who c hos e the publi c sector do signi￿c an tly b etter i n the publi c sector.
F or publi c sec to r w or k ers i n the oldest age gro up, the di￿ere n tial is insi gn i ￿c an t. F or a l l
other grou ps, the a v e ra ge w a ge di￿eren tial is signi￿c an tl yn e g ativ e, i .e .i n t e rm so fc urren t
w ag e s , p eopl ew ould b e b etter o￿ in the priv ate tha n in the publi cs e ctor. The a v e ra ge
acros s a l l gro ups, is s i gn i ￿can tly negativ ea l so . T he si ze o f the conditi o nal di￿ere n tial i s
m o dest fo r publi c sect or w ork e rs c om pa re d to priv ate sec to r w ork ers. The preci sion o f
the estim ated con di tiona l di ￿ ere n tial s is larger for pri v a te sector than for publi c sec to r
w ork e rs.
1 5
5 Su m m ary and Conc lusion
In thi s pap e rw e ana l yze pu bl ic - pri v at e s e ctor c hoice a nd w ag e stru c tures in b o th sec -
tors for G e rm an y . W e esti m ate g e ne ra l iz ed s wi tc hi ng regression m o del s , exte nd i ng the
sta ndard m o del in this ￿ e ld in v arious dire cti o ns.
W e use i nfo rm at i on o n e du c at i o n and o cc upa ti o nal status o f the pa re n ts a s additi o nal
i n strum e n ts. W et h us a v oid ad ho c ex clusion re st r icti o ns and are able to all o w fo r endo-
genei t yo f e du c at i on . W e ￿nd that the c om m on c o ncl us i on that hi gh e rl ev els o f e du c at i on
i nc reas e th e p robabili t yo fc ho o sing a publi cs e ctor jo b, is o nl yv al id if w e ass um e tha t
educ at i on is ex o genous i n the sele ction equation. A ll o wi ng for endog ene it yi m pr o v es the
m o del sign i ￿can tl y , and i m pli es that the e￿ect on the se ctor c ho i ce dro ps to z ero in term s
of size a nd signi￿c a nce le v e l. Th e p ositi v e correlati on be t w een educ at i o n and c hoic ei s
so l el y driv en b y uno bserv ed c h aracteri stics that a￿ e ct b oth in the sa m ed i rec tion.
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Note that w e can onl y consider t he a v e rag ed i ￿e re n ti al and not the i nd i vidua lv ariati on i n the di f-
fere n ti als. F or exam pl e, w e cannot pr edict the f ra c tio no f w o rk er s f or whom the di ￿ ere n ti al is p o si tiv e,




)) is not i de n ti ￿e d.15
T ot ak e accoun t of the fa c t tha t s e ctora l c hoic es are l o ng- te rm ed d e ci si o ns, w e use the
curre n ta sw el la s a ni m p ute dl ife cyc le w ag e di￿eren ti al in the sel ecti on e q ua ti on . B ot h
h a v et h er i gh ts i g n, but signi￿c a nce l ev el s are lo w. T he re su l ts sli gh tly fa v o r the use o f the
curre n tw age di￿ere n tial , whic hm a y b e due to the ro ugh w a y in whic hw e cons t ru c t the
l ife cyc lew ag e di ￿e ren ti al .F urthe r researc h on this bas e d o n the use of panel da ta i so n
our ag e nda . B ot h w ag e di￿ere n tials b e com e signi￿can t, ho w ev er, i fw ei ncl ud e e du c at i on
as a le v el v ar i ab l e in the sel ec tion e quation, i nstea d of us i ng dum m ie s. T h us the p re ci si on
of the estim a tes o f t he w ag e di￿ere n tial co e ￿ci en ts de p ends strong l y on the iden t ifyi ng
restri ctions, whic hm a yw el l expl ai nd i ￿e ren t resul ts i n the l iterature.
Not all o wi ng f or e nd ogenei t y of the educationa l le v e lr e su l ts in a su bstan ti al d o wn w ar d
b i a s i n t h e estim at e di m pact of e duca t ion l ev el on the priv ate sector w a ge. F o r all e duca-
ti o nal group s, w e ￿n d tha t u nc o ndi tiona l w ag e s a re ini tiall yh i gh e r in th e pri v ate sector,
but th i s adv an ta ge le v e ls o ut with a ge. Unconditi o nal publi cs e ctor w ages are lo w er fo r
all e du c at i o nal and age catego ri es than un c o ndi tiona l pri v at e se ctor w ages.
On a v erag e ,c o ndi tiona l w ag e s o f pub l ic sector e m plo y ee s a re so m ewha t hi gh e ri n
the p r iv ate sec to r t ha n i n the publi cs e ctor. Co nside ring sepa r at e ag e an d e du c at i on
gro ups, w e ￿nd that only tho se in the pub l ic sector wi th lo w e s t education l ev e l a re do i ng
signi￿can tl y b ette ri n the pu bl ic sector. The c o ndi tiona l w ag e di ￿ ere n tial is insigni￿can t
for the oldest ag e g roup; other ag e a nd educ at i o n gro ups w ould do s i gn i ￿can tly b e tter in
the pri v a te sector. Thi sm a yb ee x plained b y other m onetary or non -m o netary di ￿e rence s
b et w e en pu bl ic and pri v a te sec to r o c cupa ti o n si nG e rm an y , not e xpli ci tly inc luded in o ur
ana l ysis.
Our analysi s sug gests that di ￿e rence s in the results o f the m an y stu di es o n pu bl ic -
priv ate sector c hoice and pa y stru c tures m a y partly b e explai ne db yd i ￿ ere n t iden t ifyi ng
as sum pti o ns. Re laxi n g the a ssum pti o n of e xog ene it y of cruc ial v ariable sl i k e education,
m a y con si derab l yc ha nge som e of the c o ncl us i on s. On the other ha nd, the results o n
conditi o nal a nd unc o ndit ion al w ag e di￿ere n tials are fou nd to b e rem ar k able sta bl e throug h
di￿ere n t spe c i￿cations, a s long as sel ec tion i s tak en in to a c co un t.16
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T a b le 1 : M odel sp ec i￿ca ti ons and Li k eli ho o ds
Mo de l No R e str i ct i ons Sp ec i ￿c ati on Log Li k eli h ood
1 0 | -1 679. 08
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10 2 ￿( 2 ; 3) = ￿(2; 4 )=0 -1 683. 26
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= 0 -1 744. 61
Tab le 2 : Edu catio n Lev el an d Hou rs W orked , Mod el 1
--- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- -----
Edu cati on Le vel log Hour s wor ked
Var iabl e esti mate t-v alue Var iable e stima te t-va lue
--- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- -----
con stan t ed 9.0 608 0.7 1 con stant 5. 2657 101. 17
EDL EV_F 0.4 212 9.1 5 M 0. 0003 0. 03
EDL EV_M 0.2 210 3.9 7 HEA D 0. 0315 1. 80
AGE /10 -15.8 435 -0.9 2 DIN TINC -0. 0292 -1. 67
(AG E/10 )**2 10.4 728 1.1 8 LIN TINC+ 1 0. 0063 2. 11
(AG E/10 )**3 -3.0 001 -1.3 6 HOW N 0. 0192 2. 13
(AG E/10 )**4 0.3 885 1.4 6 CHI LD 0. 0062 0. 75
(AG E/10 )**5 -0.0 187 -1.4 9 AGE /10 0. 0467 1. 54
AGE _F_B IRTH 0.0 135 1.5 6 (AG E/10) **2 -0. 0061 -1. 68
AGE _M_B IRTH -0.0 026 -0.2 5 PUB LIC -0. 0461 -5. 11
<2_ PARE NTS -0.1 956 -1.3 6 LHE ARN -0. 0880 -5. 13
F_S ELF 0.3 409 2.7 3 sig ma ho urs 0. 1223 76. 21
F_C IVIL 0.8 536 5.8 5
F_W HITE 0.5 613 4.5 6
M_E MPL -0.0 718 -0.8 7
sig mae dl 1.3 177 41.1 3
bou nd 2 2.9 358 52.3 3
bou nd 3 3.7 846 72.4 8
bou nd 4 4.1 131 92.9 5
--- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- -----
Not e: b ound 1 = 0 .5; b ound 5 = 4 .520
Tab le 3 : Sel ectio n equ ation
--- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----
mod el 1 mo del 4 mode l1 2
V a r i a bl es par amete r t-v alue pa ramet er t- value para mete r t-v alue
--- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----
con stan tp p 2.1 047 0.1 3 2. 2335 0. 13 6.7 201 0.4 4
AGE /10 -7.4 239 -0.3 3 -9. 1658 -0. 41 -14.9 415 -0.7 0
(AG E/10 )**2 6.8 308 0.5 8 7. 3072 0. 61 9.8 622 0.8 6
(AG E/10 )**3 -2.3 831 -0.7 7 -2. 4004 -0. 78 -2.9 507 -0.9 8
(AG E/10 )**4 0.3 639 0.9 4 0. 3550 0. 91 0.4 131 1.0 9
(AG E/10 )**5 -0.0 205 -1.0 7 -0. 0195 -1. 03 -0.0 220 -1.1 8
F_S ELF 0.2 545 2.4 2 0. 2590 2. 44 0.1 233 1.1 4
F_C IVIL 0.5 667 4.2 3 0. 5841 4. 33 0.4 047 3.2 9
F_W HITE 0.2 615 2.3 0 0. 2337 2. 05 0.0 546 0.5 0
ED_ LEVE L
ED_ LEVE L1 0.2 102 0.2 9 -0. 3882 -1. 97 0.0 714 0.5 2
ED_ LEVE L2 0.0 595 0.0 8 -0. 2111 -0. 73 0.5 670 3.7 4
ED_ LEVE L3 -0.2 383 -0.2 8 -0. 6218 -1. 87 0.2 305 1.1 2
ED_ LEVE L4 0.4 555 0.3 5 -0. 7544 -2. 08 0.1 656 0.8 1
ED_ LEVE L5 -0.1 916 -0.2 1 0. 0142 0. 03 1.0 952 6.0 1
wag ed i ff cu rr 3.5 508 1.2 4 0. 0000 -- -- 0.0 000 --- -
wag e di ff li fec 3.2 579 0.8 2 0. 0000 -- -- 0.0 000 --- -
rho ed pp 0.3 219 3.4 1 0. 3121 3. 11 0.0 000 --- -
--- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----
Tab le 4 : Log Priv ate S ector Wage Rat e
--- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- -----
mod el 1 mode l9 m odel 12
Var iabl es par amete r t-v alue para meter t-va lue p arame ter t -val ue
--- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- -----
con st w priv 3. 0837 5. 93 4.18 21 13.92 4.120 4 1 3.85
ED_ LEVE L1 0. 2218 5. 09 0.15 15 4.30 0.153 7 4.43
ED_ LEVE L2 0. 4087 6. 47 0.27 59 6.18 0.295 3 7.71
ED_ LEVE L3 0. 5148 7. 31 0.38 58 7.36 0.396 0 7.75
ED_ LEVE L4 0. 6887 8. 93 0.55 81 9.32 0.569 1 9.64
ED_ LEVE L5 0. 8041 8. 82 0.59 98 7.99 0.643 2 1 3.22
M 0. 0981 4. 69 0.10 12 4.86 0.077 8 2.88
SIZ E 0. 0351 2. 40 0.03 61 2.44 0.030 4 1.63
EXP /10 0. 1699 3. 16 0.18 06 3.27 0.180 7 3.31
(EX P/10 )^2 -0. 0441 -3. 61 - 0.04 71 -3.88 - 0.046 9 - 3.91
AGE /10 0. 3605 3. 73 0.37 30 3.98 0.412 0 4.69
(AG E/10 )^2 -0. 0341 -3. 12 - 0.03 64 -3.52 - 0.040 4 - 4.14
LHW MONT H -0. 2912 -2. 90 - 0.49 74 -9.20 - 0.494 3 - 9.10
sig ma w 0. 2689 51. 97 0.26 78 26.61 0.264 5 6 8.39
rho w p p -0. 0290 -0. 09 - 0.22 22 -0.82 0.000 0 - ----
rho w e d -0. 3064 -2. 33 0.00 00 ---- 0.000 0 - ----
--- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- -----21
Tab le 5 : Log Publ ic Se ctor Wage Rate
--- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- -----
mo del1 mod el 9 model 12
Var iabl es pa ramet er t- value par amete r t-v alue param eter t-va lue
--- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- -----
con st w pub 4. 4153 8. 29 5.2 295 12.2 2 5.514 5 1 2.97
ED_ LEVE L1 0. 1276 2. 09 0.0 706 1.4 8 0.061 7 1.37
ED_ LEVE L2 0. 3573 4. 45 0.2 773 5.2 9 0.187 7 3.94
ED_ LEVE L3 0. 4460 4. 23 0.3 522 4.4 4 0.300 7 4.06
ED_ LEVE L4 0. 4901 3. 91 0.3 711 4.4 2 0.348 5 4.56
ED_ LEVE L5 0. 8149 7. 33 0.6 852 11.3 0 0.518 7 1 0.56
M 0. 0837 3. 30 0.0 841 3.3 1 0.131 9 4.61
SIZ E 0. 0324 1. 74 0.0 308 1.6 6 0.049 6 2.12
EXP /10 0. 2702 4. 50 0.2 810 4.5 7 0.236 2 4.25
(EX P/10 )^2 -0. 0681 -4. 89 -0.0 721 -5.0 6 - 0.058 7 - 4.79
AGE /10 0. 0994 0. 71 0.0 947 0.6 7 0.072 7 0.57
(AG E/10 )^2 0. 0070 0. 43 0.0 081 0.4 8 0.005 6 0.39
LHW MONT H -0. 5441 -6. 30 -0.6 951 -11.1 4 - 0.671 1 -1 0.70
sig ma w 0. 2837 15. 72 0.2 924 16.1 1 0.219 1 3 6.68
rho w p p 0. 6963 8. 74 0.8 042 14.1 0 0.000 0 ----
rho w e d -0. 1326 -1. 28 0.0 000 --- - 0.000 0 ----
--- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- -----
Tab le 6 : sim ulate d unc ondit ional and cond ition al wa ges; sampl em e ans
--- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----
mod el log wage priva te se ctor log wage publi c sec tor
--- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----
all p rivat e pub lic all p rivat e pub lic
--- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----
1 2.97 1 2.927 3. 052 2.66 4 2.487 2. 986
2 2.99 3 2.938 3. 128 2.67 3 2.532 3. 018
3 2.99 1 2.945 3. 086 2.68 4 2.522 3. 024
4 3.00 3 2.927 3. 142 2.67 4 2.450 2. 991
5 2.98 9 2.935 3. 113 2.67 1 2.523 3. 014
6 3.03 5 2.955 3. 233 2.70 7 2.579 3. 023
7 2.94 2 2.927 2. 977 2.64 1 2.481 2. 996
8 2.99 2 2.952 3. 078 2.67 0 2.513 3. 009
9 2.94 4 2.936 2. 961 2.63 4 2.485 2. 986
10 2.98 9 2.940 3. 084 2.91 4 2.864 3. 012
11 2.97 4 2.935 3. 047 2.89 8 2.857 2. 976
12 2.97 3 2.939 3. 058 2.90 0 2.871 2. 972
--- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----
Not e: D efini tion of mo dels: see tabl e1 .
a ll: a ll wo rkers (unc ondit iona l);
p rivat e/pub lic: worke rs in pri vate/ publi c sec tor ( condi tion al)22
T a b le 7 : sim ulate d unc ondit ional and cond ition al wa ges,
by educa tion level (ED_ LEVE L) an d AGE ; mod el 1
--- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----
lo g wag e pri vate sect or lo g wag e pub lic s ecto r
--- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----
al l priva te p ubli c al l priv ate publ ic
--- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----
ED_ LEVE L=1 2.6 94 2.68 3 2 .724 2. 455 2.3 35 2.8 01
ED_ LEVE L=2 2.8 91 2.88 1 2 .918 2. 558 2.4 36 2.8 67
ED_ LEVE L=3 3.0 44 3.02 1 3 .069 2. 765 2.5 62 2.9 85
ED_ LEVE L>=4 3.2 97 3.24 4 3 .349 2. 998 2.7 59 3.2 33
AGE <30 2.7 43 2.71 5 2 .831 2. 363 2.2 49 2.7 28
29< AGE< 40 3.0 55 3.02 2 3 .120 2. 668 2.5 16 2.9 71
39< AGE< 50 3.0 94 3.05 9 3 .155 2. 790 2.6 19 3.0 88
AGE >49 2.9 15 2.91 5 3 .015 2. 821 2.6 14 3.0 35
--- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----
Tab le8 : 90 perce nt co nfide nce i nter vals uncon ditio nal a nd co ndit ional
wag e dif feren tials ; mod el 1 .
--- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- -----
[(p ublic sect or wa ge ra te/p rivat e sec tor w age r ate)- 1]10 0%
--- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- -----
all worke rs priv ate s ector p ublic sec tor
--- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- -----
ED_ LEVE L=1 - 22.2 -19. 3 -30. 0 -2 6.6 0.6 9. 9
ED_ LEVE L=2 - 28.3 -26. 8 -35. 6 -3 4.1 - 6.1 -2. 5
ED_ LEVE L=3 - 25.3 -22. 6 -37. 4 -3 4.6 - 8.9 -4. 9
ED_ LEVE L=4 - 26.1 -23. 3 -39. 8 -3 7.1 -1 0.9 -6. 4
AGE <30 - 32.9 -30. 4 -38. 4 -3 6.0 -1 2.4 -7. 4
29< AGE - 31.5 -28. 9 -39. 5 -3 7.0 -1 3.8 -9. 5
39< AGE - 25.7 -24. 0 -34. 8 -3 2.9 - 7.2 -3. 7
AGE >49 - 15.7 -12. 9 -28. 7 -2 5.6 - 0.0 4. 5
all - 26.3 -25. 3 -35. 4 -3 4.4 - 6.3 -4. 3
--- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- -----23
A p p e n d ix : Data de scrip tio n
Tab le A 1: E xplan ation of V ariab les
--- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- -
Var iabl e
--- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- -
AGE Age o f Ind ividu al
EXP a) Actua l Lab or Ma rket Expe rienc e of Indiv idual
ED_ LEVE L0 Dummy ;1i f bas ic o ri n terme diate scho oling (Hau pt/R ealsc hule)
ED_ LEVE L1 Dummy ;1i f bas ic sc hool ing a nd ap prent icesh ip
ED_ LEVE L2 Dummy ;1i f int ermed iate scho oling and appre ntice ship
ED_ LEVE L3 Dummy ;1i f hig h sch ool (Gymn asium , Fac hhoch schul e)/h igh s chool and appre ntice ship
ED_ LEVE L4 Dummy ;1i f eng ineer ing schoo l or highe r spe cific sch ool
ED_ LEVE L5 Dummy ;1i f uni versi ty
ED_ LEVE L Order ed va riabl e on educ ation , cal culat ed fr om in form ation abou t deg ree
TEA RN Total Mont hly G ross Earn ings
HWM ONTH b) Hours work ed pe r mon th f or pa y
LHW MONT H Log o f Hou rs wo rked per month for pay
HEA RN Hourl y ear nings
LHE ARN Log o f Hou rly e arnin gs
INT INC Inter est i ncome per mont h
LIN TINC +1 Log(I ntere st in come per month +1)
DIN TINC Dummy ;1i f int erest inc ome
M Dummy ;1i f mar ried
BLU E Dummy ;1i f blu e col lar
WHI TE Dummy ;1i f whi te co llar
CIV IL Dummy ;1i f civ il se rvan t
HOW N Dummy ; 1 i f ind ividu al h ouse owner
HEA D Dummy ; 1i f ind ividu al h ead o f hou sehol d
PUB LIC Dummy ;1i f emp loyed in publi c sec tor
SIZ E Dummy ;1i f tow n lar ger than 100 0 00 in habit ants
CHI LD Dummy ;1i f chi ld yo unge r tha n1 6 i nh o useho ld
F_E RW Dummy ;1i f fat her e mplo yed w hen i ndivi dual was 1 5
F_S ELF Dummy ;1i f fat her s elf emplo yed
F_W HITE Dummy ;1i f fat her w hite coll ar
F_B LUE Dummy ;1i f fat her b lue colla r
F_C IVIL Dummy ;1i f fat her c ivil serv ant
M_E MPL Dummy ;1i f mot her e mplo yed w hen i ndivi dual was 1 5
<2_ PARE NTS Dummy ;1i f gro wn up wit h fat her o r mot her o nly
EDL EV_F Order ed ed ucati on va riab le, f ather (con struc ted f rom degre e inf ormat ion)
EDL EV_M Order ed ed ucati on va riab le, m other (con struc ted f rom degre e inf ormat ion)
AGE _F_B IRTH Age o f fat her w hen i ndiv idual was born
AGE _M_B IRTH Age o f mot her w hen i ndiv idual was born
--- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----
a) Construc te d from a bio gr a phical s c he m e ; after the a ge of 15 .
b) Tw ov ari ables on hours w ork ed are a v ail able: norm al h o ur s w o rk e d, and actual hours w ork ed
i n cludi ng o v ertim e. F urthe rm o r e, the i ndivi dual w as ask ed whethe r o v er ti m ew ork w as pa id for. The
v a ri abl e on hours w ork e d use d her e m easu res e ar n ings-e￿e ctive hours w o rk e d and w as c o n struc ted a s
fo ll o ws: If the indi vidual r ep orte d o v e rtim eh o u rs and o v e rtim ew o rk i sp a id fo r, hwmon t h i s constr ucte d
on the basis of th i sm easu re. In other c ases , hwmon t h i s c onstr ucte d o n the ba si so f norm a l hours w ork ed.24
Tab le A 2: Mi ssing Info rmati on
--- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ---
N umber Obse rvati on: Per cent Publ ic:
--- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ---
Mal es i n dep enden t emp loyme nt 1809 29. 96
No Miss ings in:
AGE _F_B IRTH, AGE_ M_BIR TH 1749 30. 36
EDL EV_F , EDL EV_M 1722 30. 48
F_E RW, M_EMP L 1564 31. 39
ED_ LEVE L 1557 31. 34
TEA RN, HWMON TH 1428 31. 93
--- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ---
Tab le A 3: De scrip tive Stati stics
--- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----- ----
Poo led Pr ivate Publ ic
Va riab le Mea n St d Dev Me an S td De v Mean Std Dev
--- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----- ----
PU BLIC 0.3 19 0 1
AG E 39.7 11 11 .302 38. 895 1 1.426 4 1.45 1 10. 841
EX P 19.6 68 11 .718 19. 387 1 1.796 2 0.26 7 11. 541
ED LEV 3.2 63 2 .144 2. 902 1.884 4.03 2 2. 443
ED LEV_ F 2.2 10 1 .688 2. 131 1.652 2.37 7 1. 752
ED LEV_ M 1.4 75 1 .171 1. 400 1.102 1.63 5 1. 293
SI ZE 0.5 56 0 .496 0. 549 0.497 0.57 2 0. 495
AG E_F_ BIRTH 31.6 22 7 .052 31. 513 7.089 3 1.85 5 6. 974
AG E_M_ BIRTH 28.3 97 5 .981 28. 344 6.059 2 8.50 8 5. 815
HW MONT H 167.9 24 23 .956 170. 543 2 4.752 16 2.34 2 21. 133
TE ARN 3 366.3 85 1279 .640 3341. 042 131 0.932 342 0.40 5 1209. 868
HE ARN 20.2 94 7 .892 19. 750 7.640 2 1.45 5 8. 294
LH EARN 2.9 45 0 .355 2. 919 0.353 3.00 1 0. 351
IN TINC 193.4 41 701 .630 176. 326 65 0.588 22 9.92 5 799. 187
DI NTIN C 0.2 47 0. 235 0.27 4
HO WN 0.4 17 0. 389 0.47 6
M 0.7 64 0. 757 0.78 0
BL UE 0.4 62 0. 584 0.20 3
WH ITE 0.3 67 0. 410 0.27 6
CI VIL 0.1 66 0. 002 0.51 7
CH ILD 0.4 55 0. 463 0.43 8
HE AD 0.8 97 0. 871 0.95 3
F_ SELF 0.1 43 0. 134 0.16 2
F_ CIVI L 0.1 03 0. 075 0.16 4
F_ WHIT E 0.1 41 0. 134 0.15 5
M_ EMPL 0.4 12 0. 422 0.39 0
<2 _PAR ENTS 0.0 69 0. 068 0.07 0
--- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----- ----
NOB S 142 8 972 44 8
--- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ---- ----- ----- ----25
A p p e n d ix : Mo d el S pe ci￿c a tion and Lik eliho o d
Mo de l
W e address the issue o f e ndogenei t y of exp erie nce b y rewri t i ng some of t h e equations and b y
addi ng an equ a ti o n expl aini ng exp eri ence. The equations (1) ( ed ucation l ev el ) ,( 3) (sele ct i on)
and (4) ( hours w or k ed ) remai n un c hanged.
Exp e ri e nc e :i f w ea l l o w for endogenei t y of e ducation l ev e l , it is a ls o na tural to al lo w for
end o gen eit y of e xp eri ence , si nce exp erien ce w i l l b e negativ el y a￿ e cted b y edu cat io n le v el . W e
add a regression equat i on to expl ain exp eri enc e (E xp ) :









DE is t he v ec t or of e ducational dummie s (see sec t io n 4 ) . X
Ex p
co n tain s age and ot he r
exogenous v a ri a bl es . Assu m pt i ons ab out u
Ex p
determin e whether thi s equati o n should expl i citl y
be t ak en in to a c coun t( see b e lo w ).











ln H + u
j
;j =0 ; 1 : ( 6)
X
W
no w excl ud es e xp eri ence . g
W
i s a giv en func t io n ( for exa mp le a li near com bi nation of
edu cat i on dum mi es, Ex p and Ex p
2
) .
W age di ￿ er en ti al s i n selec tio n equat ion:i n ( 3 ), w e i ncl ude b oth the cu r ren t and t he
l ife c ycle w age di ￿eren t i al. The r ea re t w ow a ys t o de ￿ne the curren tw age di ￿eren t i al:
￿
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. It i s t he d i￿ eren ce b et w een p redi cted l o gw a ges for




.W e d enote
these l og w ages b yl n WP
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. Assume f or the momen t that ￿
l
=0 (no li fe cyc le w age di ￿ eren ti al i n (3) ).
Then, i f w e use ￿
c 2




























). Thi s sho w st ha t (7) a nd (8 ) l ead to observ ational equi v al en t









F ort h e l ife c ycle w age di ￿eren t i al, aga in , t w o de￿ ni t i ons can b e suggested.
￿
L1
l nW = l n NPV(WP
1
) ￿ l n NPV(WP
0









) ; (1 1)
where NPV(WP
0
) a n d N P V ( WP
1
) a r e t h e n et presen tv a l ue s of pred ic t ed w a ges i n the t w o
sector s, for some gi v e n di scoun t rat e . The pat tern o f l og w a ges as a functi o no f a g e and exp eri enc e
is t ak en i n to acc o un t .I n f a ct ,w ea p pro xi ma te NPV b yt he a v erage v al ue of predi cted w ages
at ￿v e equ id ista n t p oin ts of time duri ng an i nd ivi dual ’ sw orkin g li fe. Thi s i s a rat he r r o ug h
appro xi mat i on. W ea ssu m et ha t i ndi vid uals d o n o tc hange sec t or or l ose thei r j ob, and that
cohort e￿ects do n o ta ￿ect w ag es . W orki ng with the l i fe cyc le w a ge di ￿ eren ti a l requ ires a n




o f one i ndi vid ual are














, ( 1 0 ) and (1 1) l ead to observ ational e quiv ale n t mo del s, as in
the case of the c urren tw age di ￿ er en t i al. W e therefore w or kw i t h( 1 0).













w e a d d the a ssump t i on that u
E xp
i s in dep enden t of u and of a l l exog e nous v ari a b les.
Li k el iho o d Con tri bu t ions
W e u se the sele ct i on e quat i on giv en i n (9) . T h e case w i th the li fe c ycle w a ge di￿eren tial i s
si m i l a r. Consi der someone w or ki ng i n the pub li c sec t or (S = 1). E , Ex p , W
1







ar e not observ ed. Denot e, f or giv en par ameter v al ues, the ’resid uals’











a n d u
H
. D e note t h e densi t y of x cond iti o na lo nyb yf
x j y
. T h e lik e lih ood c o n tr i buti on ca n

























Here R ( E) is the reg io n o f p o ssi bl e v alu es o f E
￿
f ort he o bs er v ed v alue of E (for gi v en
para me t ers m
j
). R(S) i s de￿ne d li k e wise (R (S )= [ 0 ; 1 ) ). X con t ai ns a l l exogenous v ariabl es.





































cor resp ondi ng R(E) a n d R(S).
De t is the Jacobian t erm:





Thei n tegra l i n (13 ) can b e wri t ten as a de nsit y times a b iv a ri at e condi t i onal p r obabi l it y:
L =
q






































The in tegra l i sab i v ariate cu m ul at iv en o rmal p ro ba b ili t y (see, e. g., Greene , 199 3, p. 76 ).
Si nce u
Ex p








































The facto r rel at ed t o u
Ex p
i s t he o n ly facto r con ta in in g t h e par ameters in ( 5) and con tai ns
no o ther para meters. As a c o ns e quenc e, (5) can b e i g no red whi l e e st im a ti ng the rest of t he
mo del ; t h e mo del can b e estimated as i f Ex p w as exogenous. The i n tuiti o n is that end o gene it y
of E xp is o nl y ca us ed b y en dog e nei t yo fE , and thi s i s t ak en i n to a cc o un t .
Sim ul at i ons
T o co mp ute t he w ag e d i￿eren tial s i n secti o n6 ,w eh a v e used the mo del t o sim ul at e al l en dog e nous
v ari a b les, ta ki ng exogenous v a ri able s a sg iv en. W eh a v e treat ed exp erien ce as an en dog e nous
v ari a b le. F or t h is p urp ose, w e sp e cify a nd estimate (5 ). W e use a li near equation, and as su me
norma lit yo fu
Ex p
. The est i mat e d rel a ti o ni s
Ex p = ￿ 15 :22 ￿ 1:1 0DE 1￿ 3 : 03 DE 2￿ 4 : 40DE 3￿6 : 6 1 DE 4￿ 8 : 62DE 5+0 : 93AGE +0 : 69 M + u
Ex p
( 1 7)
DE1 -D E5 a re the educati o nl e v el du m mi es ( 0 excl uded ) . M i s 1i fm arrie d, 0 otherwi se. Al l
v ari a b les are si gni ￿can ta t the 5 p ercen tl e v el. The est i mat eo f ￿ ( u
Ex p
) is4 . 2 2; the R
2
i s 0. 87.
Thes i m ul at io n n o ww orks as fol lo ws. F o r eac h i ndi vi dual , w e dra w1 0 v al ues o f all e r ror
terms fro mt h e esti ma ted sixv ar ia t e norma l distrib ution o f erro rt erms. Usin g act ua lv alu es of
exogenous v a ri a bl es ,w er e cursiv el y compute E fr om (1) , Ex p f rom (1 7), and S fro m (3). F or
eac hs e ctor sep a ratel y ,w e solv e (2) and (5) to c o mpu t el n W
0
a n dl n W
1
. W et h e na v erag eo v er
dra ws p er ind ivi dual and o v er i nd ivi dual s i n the ( su b)p opul at i on. In t hi s w a yw e construct
ta b les 6 and 7, b a sed on the para meter estimat es . F or ta b l e8 ,w er e p eated the exerci se 1 00
times, fo r 100 dra ws of the para meter v ector fro m its estimated a symptot i c d istrib ution. Th e
con￿d ence in terv al s ar e b ound ed b y the 5 a n d 95 p erce n t il es o ft he 10 0 outcomes.28
6 F i gu r e s29